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Does Aid for Education Educate Children?
Evidence from Panel Data
Axel Dreher, Peter Nunnenkamp, and Rainer Thiele
Most of the aid effectiveness literature has focused on the potential growth effects of
aggregate aid, with inconclusive results. Considering that donors have repeatedly
stressed the multidimensionality of their objectives, a more disaggregated view on aid
effectiveness is warranted. The impact of aid on education is analyzed empirically for
almost 100 countries over 1970–2004. The effectiveness of sector-specific aid is
assessed within the framework of social production functions. The Millennium
Development Goals related to education, particularly the goal of achieving universal
primary school enrollment, are considered as outcome variables. The analysis suggests
that higher per capita aid for education significantly increases primary school enroll-
ment, while increased domestic government spending on education does not. This
result is robust to the method of estimation, the use of instruments to control for the
endogeneity of aid, and the set of control variables included in the estimations.
JEL codes: F35, O11, H52, I22
There is heated debate over whether foreign aid is effective in promoting
economic development. According to Sen (2006) and Tarp (2006), Easterly’s
(2006) claim that aid has done “so much ill and so little good” obscures the
fact that aid can work if done right. Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp (2004) find
that overall aid has indeed been effective. Even recent surveys of the literature
on aid and growth come to sharply opposing conclusions. While Doucouliagos
and Paldam (2005) conclude that the aid effectiveness literature has failed to
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establish that aid works, McGillivray and others (2005) stress that almost all
research published since the late 1990s finds that it does.
What both camps tend to ignore is that different types of aid are unlikely to
have the same economic effects on recipient countries. In much of the litera-
ture, it is still common to run panel regressions with aggregate aid flows as the
explanatory variable. Work by Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavnani (2004) on
short-impact aid has initiated a shift toward using disaggregated aid data.
It is open to debate whether a verdict on the effectiveness of aid can be
reached at all as long as the analysis is restricted to the aid-growth nexus.
Donors have repeatedly stressed that they pursue multiple objectives when
granting aid (see, for example, Isenman and Ehrenpreis 2003). Specific-purpose
aid intended to support donors’ policy statements, including the empowerment
of the poor through better education, tends to escape analyses narrowly
focused on aid and growth.
Against this backdrop, it seems appropriate to pursue a different avenue for
assessing the effectiveness of aid. This article focuses on more specific outcome
variables than growth. It uses disaggregated aid data to investigate the link
between aid granted to the education sector and education outcomes.
Education figures prominently among the Millennium Development Goals.
Donors have committed themselves to helping countries achieve universal
primary education by 2015 and eliminate gender disparities in education. To
this end, donors have devoted an increasing share of aid resources to the edu-
cation sector (Thiele, Nunnenkamp, and Dreher 2007).
Yet, it is open to debate whether more resources necessarily translate into
better education outcomes or how aid can play a role in achieving universal
primary education (Roberts 2003). The effectiveness of aid for education is
assessed here within the framework of social production functions. The results
show that higher per capita aid significantly increases primary school enroll-
ment. This outcome is robust to the method of estimation and to the set of
control variables included.
The article is organized as follows. Section I provides the analytical back-
ground and discusses the literature on aid and education. Section II addresses
data issues. The method of estimation and main results are presented in Section
III, and various tests for robustness are performed in Section IV. The article
closes with some concluding remarks about the implications of the findings for
policy and future research.
I . A N A L Y T I C A L B A C K G R O U N D A N D R E L E VA N T L I T E R A T U R E
A social production function with education-related outcomes as the
left-hand-side variable is estimated in which aid for education enters as an
explanatory variable. Schultz (1988) proposed a production–demand frame-
work to model the educational system of countries in the 1980s. The concept
of a social production function has also been used in the literature on the link
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between government expenditure and social outcomes. Hanushek (1995, p. 2)
considers this concept to be “most appealing and useful” to assess the relation
between school outcomes and measurable educational inputs. Recent examples
following this approach include Bennell (2002), Roberts (2003), and Baldacci,
Guin-Siu, and de Mello (2003).
While the exact specification of social production functions varies, the
common feature is that it includes major demand and supply factors (Roberts
2003). For the production function for education, demand factors typically
considered include per capita income (a proxy for household poverty), adult lit-
eracy (a proxy for the educational status of parents), the relative size of the
school population, and the level of urbanization. The “price” of schooling also
affects demand, although it is typically not included in empirical cross-country
analyses because of lack of data. School fees are supposed to inhibit enroll-
ment, which is why free universal primary education has been advocated (see,
for example, Bruns, Mingat, and Rakotomalala 2003).1
Public spending on education figures prominently among the supply factors
considered in social production functions. Other potentially relevant supply
factors include the pupil–teacher ratio and the unit costs of education. The
regression analysis conducted below extends the production function concept
by adding aid for education as an additional supply factor.
Various studies find that demand factors explain most of the variance in
school attendance (enrollment, completion rates) and educational attainment
(youth literacy, test scores) across countries. Surveying the literature, Roberts
(2003) concludes that per capita income tends to be the most powerful driving
force of school performance; supply-side factors, in particular public expendi-
ture on education, are statistically insignificant in most instances.2 Roberts’
own cross-country regression analysis corroborates the finding of ineffective
public expenditure and finds that adult literacy is the main demand-side factor.
Clemens (2004) shows that school enrollment rises only slowly over time and
that the impact of education policy is relatively small compared with that of
long-term economic changes.3
Very few studies consider foreign aid for education as a possibly important
supply-side factor in the production function; studies that do so (Michaelowa
and Weber 2006; Wolf 2007) are inconclusive. The aid literature focuses on
whether aid helps achieve economic and social objectives by providing
1. The success of the Mexican anti-poverty program Progresa, in which educational subsidies in the
form of conditional transfer payments to poor families increased enrollment, provides evidence for this
notion (Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd 2005).
2. See Clemens (2004) and the references given there. Cross-country studies include Filmer and
Pritchett (1999), Mingat and Tan (2003), and Baldacci, Guin-Siu, and de Mello (2003).
3. While this rather bleak picture concerning the ability of government spending on education to
raise education outcomes appears to represent the majority view in the literature, there are some notable
exceptions, including Gupta, Verhoeven, and Tiongson (1999) and Baldacci and others (2004).
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additional resources for financing pro-poor expenditure and on the extent to
which aid is fungible. Although Pettersson (2006) finds a high degree of
fungibility, some other studies show the aid–expenditure link to be important.
Gomanee and others (2003) and Mosley, Hudson, and Verschoor (2004) find
that aid alleviates poverty through its effect on public expenditure. Gomanee
and others (2005) reach the opposite conclusion in a more recent version of
their article.
The effects of aid working through public expenditure could be captured by
estimating a system of equations that includes a public expenditure equation
with aid as one explanatory variable (Mosley, Hudson, and Verschoor 2004).4
However, such an approach suffers from several problems. It is conceptually
demanding, because the specification of the equations should ideally be based
on a complete theoretical model, and the determinants of all dependent vari-
ables would have to be included in the estimations. The more conventional
approach of instrumenting potentially endogenous variables in the production
function for education has the advantage that instruments need explain only
some fraction of the variation in the instrumented variables.
Furthermore, the interpretation of coefficients in the public expenditure
equation is plagued with problems, particularly regarding the aid coefficient.
A coefficient that is not significantly different from zero does not necessarily
imply that aid is highly fungible and that aid does not add to overall (foreign
and domestic) resources devoted to education. This implication would hold
only if (most) aid were accounted for in the public budget of the recipient
country.5 However, project aid for education—the most important mode of aid
delivery, at least until recently—often remains outside the budget (Roberts
2003). If all aid remain outside the budget, full fungibility implies an aid coeffi-
cient of 21. As it is impossible to determine the proportion of aid outside and
inside the budget, estimation of the public expenditure equation offers no
meaningful insights. For this reason, estimating a system of equations is not the
preferred option.
The approach taken here follows the seminal contribution of Borenszstein,
de Gregorio, and Lee (1998) on the economic growth effects of foreign direct
investment (FDI). They consider both foreign and domestic investment in asses-
sing whether foreign investment is more productive in raising growth.
Analogously, an enrollment equation is estimated here that includes both aid
for education and government expenditure on education as explanatory
variables.
Aid for education may be more effective in raising enrollment rates than
government expenditure on education, for several reasons (Roberts 2003).
4. This approach was adopted in an earlier version of this article.
5. The authors thank an anonymous referee for alerting them to the critical importance of this
assumption.
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First, at least 75 percent of government expenditure typically consists of
teacher salaries, which were not covered by donors until recently (Michaelowa
and Weber 2006). Donors provide aid for building schools, supplying teaching
materials, improving school management, and reforming curricula, in the hope
of improving the learning environment, the efficiency of schools, and the
quality of education, which may provide stronger incentives to attend school.
Second, government expenditure on education is often biased against the
poor, the population segment for which enrollment rates tend to be relatively
low (Bennell 2002). This contrasts with donor strategies emphasizing poor and
disadvantaged groups, in particular girls, for whom school attendance is often
lower than for boys.
Third, leakage of local funds appears to be high (Reinikka and Svensson
2001) and capture by producers and privileged consumers to be common.
External donors may succeed at least partly in mitigating leakage and capture
of aid funds by not channeling aid through the public budget of the recipient
country, by involving local authorities in aid allocation processes, and by
increasingly applying performance-based allocation rules. Measures such as
these are recent, however; before the 1990 Jomtien Conference, which empha-
sized the importance of universal primary education, donor support concen-
trated on higher levels of education (Thiele, Nunnenkamp, and Dreher 2007).
Consequently, it remains an empirical question whether foreign aid has been
more effective than domestic public spending on education in promoting
primary school enrollment.
I I . D A T A I S S U E S
The data for assessing the impact of aid for education on education outcomes
are far from perfect. The aid data—on commitments of sector-specific aid,
including aid for education—come from the Creditor Reporting System (CRS)
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/
Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC). These data are imperfect
because commitment data tend to overstate actual aid flows (commitments
may not be fully disbursed) and because sector-specific commitments go partly
unreported (Michaelowa and Weber 2006). These measurement problems,
which work in opposite directions, cannot be resolved, because sector-specific
disbursement data are not available before 1990. The correlation between com-
mitments and disbursements of aid for education over the period for which
both series are available is fairly high, with correlation coefficients of 0.70 for
1990–94, 0.71 for 1995–99, and 0.80 for 2000–04.
It can be argued that employing sector-specific aid data understates the con-
tribution of aid to education objectives in recent years. Several donors now
favor general budget support over project aid for specific targets. The extent to
which general budget support is ultimately used for educational objectives is
not known.
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A similar argument can be made about multisector aid. However, the evalu-
ation of the composition of aid in Thiele, Nunnenkamp and Dreher (2007)
suggests that this is unlikely to pose serious problems. In contrast to donor
announcements, the shares of general budget support and multisector aid in
total aid were actually lower in 2002–04 than in the early 1990s.
Nevertheless, the robustness of results is checked by replicating the estimates
for a shorter period of observation (excluding recent years, in which donors
may have increasingly supported educational objectives through aid that is not
picked up in sector-specific aid data).
Data limitations with respect to education outcome variables are well
known (Roberts 2003; Bennell 2002). Ideally, the outcome variable of the pro-
duction function should go beyond enrollment rates to include educational
attainment and the quality of education. Enrollment rates may provide a mis-
leading picture. Clemens (2004) draws on detailed country studies to show that
rising enrollment rates came at the cost of deteriorating quality of education in
some countries, as reflected by much higher pupil–teacher ratios, higher failure
and repetition rates, and lower test scores. Furthermore, some countries report
unreasonably high net enrollment ratios (more than 100).
Qualitative dimensions of education, such as improved literacy and test
scores, are not available for a sufficiently large number of countries over a suffi-
ciently long period of time. However, distortions resulting from the short-
comings of enrollment rates as an education outcome variable were minimized
in several ways. First, completion rates were considered as an alternative indi-
cator. Second, near universal enrollment rates were checked against reported
ratios of boys to girls (enrollment rates of almost 100 percent are inconsistent
with gender imbalance): except in Tajikistan, no major discrepancy was
detected. Third, additional estimates were run for a reduced sample, eliminat-
ing countries with exceptionally large increases in enrollment rates.
Another data problem concerns the time-series dimension. In 2003, the
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),
the original source of the World Bank data used here, revised its estimates of
net primary enrollment for 1998–2001. For some countries, this revision is
associated with a major break in the series on primary enrollment. These
countries were identified by comparing the old and new data in years for
which both series are available (normally 1998–2000) (see Clemens 2004 for a
similar approach). Discrepancies were minor (less than 2 percentage points) in
69 of the 119 sample countries for which this comparison was possible. The
revision resulted in major discrepancies (more than 10 percentage points) in 15
countries, in 8 of which the old series appears to have overstated enrollment
rates. This problem was dealt with in the tests for robustness by replicating the
analysis for a shorter period of observation, 1970–97. In this way, the risk of
inconsistencies over time can be reduced, even though the old series may suffer
from systematic over- or underreporting by some countries.
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I I I . M E T H O D O F E S T I M A T I O N A N D B A S E R E S U L T S
Net primary school enrollment is the dependent variable throughout this
section. The main explanatory variables of interest are aid to the education
sector and government spending on education. (Using aid and spending on
primary education is conceptually superior but would leave an insufficient
number of observations for estimation.) Aid and government expenditure are
measured on a per capita basis. In aid-growth regressions, aid is typically
defined relative to the recipient country’s gross domestic product (GDP). This
provides a reasonable measure of the importance of foreign support relative to
the recipient country’s overall resources. Aid per capita is more appropriate
than the aid to GDP ratio in assessing aid effectiveness with respect to specific
Millennium Development Goals. In particular, achieving universal primary
education requires accounting for the number of people among whom the
resources devoted to education must be shared.
For other relevant covariates, the analysis closely follows the literature on
education production functions in considering four demand-side variables:
adult literacy, per capita GDP,6 share of the population under 15, and share of
the urban population in total population. Lagged education outcome is
included as an additional explanatory variable in order to account for the poss-
ible persistence in outcomes. Additional supply-side variables suggested in the
literature are added later to test for the sensitivity of results.
Pooled time-series cross-section (panel data) regressions are estimated for a
maximum of 96 low- and middle-income countries between 1970 and 2004
(with the exception of data on aid, which are available only since 1973).7 As
some of the data are not available on an annual basis, all data are five-year
averages. (The definitions of and sources for all variables are listed in
table A-1; summary statistics are reported in table A-2.)
The basic equation takes the following form:
schooli;t ¼ aþ b1schooli;t1 þ b2aidi;t þ b3spendingi;t þ BX þ hi þ 1i;t ð1Þ
where schooli,t represents the logarithm of primary school enrollment in
country i in year t; aidi,t is per capita foreign aid to the education sector; and
spendingi,t is per capita government expenditure on education. X is the vector
of control variables, hi represents country fixed effects, and 1i,t represents the
disturbance term.
The dependent variable, schooli,t, is limited by a lower bound of zero and an
upper bound of 100. The upper bound may lead to biased results in the sense
6. Following most earlier studies estimating social production functions (for example, Gupta,
Verhoeven, and Tiongson 1999; Roberts 2003; and Michaelowa and Weber 2006), per capita GDP is
measured in levels.
7. High-income countries were excluded because they receive no aid. The World Bank (2007)
defines high-income countries as those with a 2005 GNI per capita of at least $10,726.
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that aid can have little effect on enrollment in recipient countries with
enrollment rates of close to 100 percent.8 One way to deal with this problem is
through logistic rather than log linear estimation (Fielding, McGillivray, and
Torres 2005). A different route is taken here. While the analysis follows the
standard approach of the literature, which includes enrollment either in levels
or in logs, it tests robustness by excluding recipient countries where enrollment
rates exceed a certain threshold and may thus bias results downward.
Aid cannot reasonably be expected to be exogenous to school enrollment:
donors typically grant more aid to countries that are less developed.
Nevertheless, as a first step fixed- and random-effects models that ignore the
potential endogeneity are estimated before we present specifications that allow
for the endogeneity of aid and government expenditure.9
The qualitative findings do not depend on the inclusion of random or fixed
country effects. However, the random-effects specification is rejected in favor
of the fixed-effects model (Hausman test, P ¼ 0.00), so only fixed-effects esti-
mates are reported (table 1, column 1). An F-test also shows that fixed country
effects cannot be omitted (P ¼ 0.00). By contrast, fixed-period effects did not
turn out to be significant, so the estimates do not include them.
The estimates reveal a considerable degree of inertia in primary school
enrollment. The lagged dependent variable is highly significant.10 Clearly, it
has some explanatory power, rendering insignificant most of the other covari-
ates included in the regression. The fixed-effects model indicates that literacy,
the share of the population under the age of 15, and the degree of urbanization
do not significantly affect enrollment.11
Most surprisingly perhaps, per capita GDP does not have the expected posi-
tive impact on school enrollment, even when per capita GDP is alternatively
specified in logs (not shown). As noted earlier, cross-country evidence suggests
that per capita income is an important determinant of enrollment.12 By con-
trast, the explanatory power of per capita GDP is rather weak in the few panel
studies that have been conducted. The insignificance of per capita GDP in
table 1 is similar to the results obtained by Michaelowa and Weber (2006) as
8. The authors thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
9. The estimator is biased and inconsistent in a short panel because of the inclusion of the lagged
dependent variable and fixed- or random-country effects. The GMM estimator presented later takes this
into account.
10. A second lag of the dependent variable turned out to be completely insignificant.
11. Estimates based on a panel-corrected standard error model (not shown) point to a very strong
relation between adult literacy and enrollment across countries, corroborating the findings of Gupta,
Verhoeven, and Tiongson (1999) and Roberts (2003).
12. Even among cross-country studies, there are notable exceptions. Gupta, Verhoeven, and
Tiongson (1999) do not find a robust effect of per capita GDP on enrollment. Mingat and Tan (1998)
show that the cross-country correlation between per capita GDP and education is relatively weak when
higher-income countries are excluded from the calculation, as they are in this article.
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TA B L E 1. School Enrollment and per Capita Aid to Education, 1970–2004
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged dependent 0.38 (3.82)*** 0.65 (6.99)*** 0.44 (4.63)*** 0.40 (3.52)***
Expenditure on education (per capita) 0.000034 (0.37) 20.000198 (1.47) 0.000220 (0.75) 0.001523 (1.04)
Aid for education (per capita) 0.0026 (2.89)*** 0.0029 (2.34)** 0.0268 (2.69)*** 0.0243 (2.24)**
Literacy rate 0.0034 (1.35) 0.0019 (1.75)* 0.0046 (1.19) 0.0081 (1.43)
GDP per capita 20.000003 (0.61) 0.000008 (1.42) 0.000028 (1.29) 0.000003 (0.08)
Population under 15 0.001 (0.34) 0.001 (0.88) 0.019 (2.16)** 0.020 (2.17)**
Urbanization 20.00022 (0.09) 20.00015 (0.30) 0.00420 (0.97) 0.00035 (0.05)
Number of countries 94 94 61 61
Number of observations 267 267 156 156
Maximum number of periods 6 4 4 4
Method Fixed effects System GMM 2SLS 2SLS
R-squared (overall) 0.93 0.41 0.40
Number of instruments 53 9 9
Hansen test (Prob. x2) 0.60 0.11 0.14
Difference-in-Sargan test (Prob. x2) 0.17
Arellano-Bond test (Prob. z) 0.24
First-stage F-test 6.32 5.55
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, estimated robustly. The dependent variable is the logarithm of primary school enrollment in country i at
year t.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in table A-1.
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well as Baldacci and others (2004).13 The weak explanatory power of per
capita GDP in panel studies may at least partly reflect the fact that these
studies capture short- to medium-run effects through the time dimension,
whereas the effects in cross-section analyses are purely long term.
The results show a positive correlation between aid and school enrollment,
with coefficients significant at the 1 percent level. As in much of the previous
literature, government expenditure on education does not affect enrollment sig-
nificantly. Because both government expenditure and aid enter the regression,
the significant coefficient of aid suggests that it is more productive than dom-
estic government spending in raising school enrollment.
In the next step, the potential endogeneity of aid and government expenditure
is taken into account (columns 2–4), starting with the system generalized
method of moments (GMM) estimator, as suggested by Arellano and Bover
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The dynamic panel GMM estimator
exploits an assumption about the initial conditions to obtain moment conditions
that remain informative even for persistent data and is considered most appropri-
ate in the presence of endogenous regressors. Results are based on the two-step
estimator implemented by Roodman (2005) in Stata, including Windmeijer’s
(2005) finite sample correction. Aid and government expenditure are treated as
endogenous and the additional covariates as strictly exogenous. The validity of
these assumptions was tested by applying the Hansen test (amounting to a test
for the exogeneity of the covariates) and the Arellano-Bond test of second-order
autocorrelation, which must be absent from the data for the estimator to be
consistent. Both tests turned out to be borderline when the first lags of the aid
variable and the dependant variable are included as instruments. This may
suggest that aid once lagged is endogenous and thus invalid as an instrument.
Therefore, the first lags were excluded from the list of instruments. The test stat-
istics do then clearly not reject the specification at conventional levels of signifi-
cance.14 A difference-in-Sargan test was does also performed on the additional
instruments in the system GMM. This test also does not reject the specification.
The results remain qualitatively unchanged when the system GMM estima-
tor is employed (column 2 in table 1).15 Results obtained by rerunning the
regression using the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM difference estimator (not
reported) corroborate the main results of the system GMM estimation,
although the literacy rate no longer significantly affects school enrollment.
13. Baldacci and others (2004), who do not include aid as a regressor, find per capita GDP to be a
significant determinant of enrollment only in some of their estimated equations.
14. Additional tests were performed for third- and fourth-order serial correlation, which does not
seem to be present in the data.
15. Excluding the first lag of the endogenous variables reduces the number of instruments to 53.
The regression was replicated excluding the second and third lags to ensure that the results do not
depend on this still substantial number of instruments. This step reduced the number of instruments to
28. The relevant test statistics do clearly not reject the specification, and the results are not affected. In
particular, the difference-in-Sargan test (Prob. x2) is 0.42.
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Two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions are estimated instrumenting
for aid as an alternative procedure for addressing the endogeneity issue.
The International Country Risk Guide, the Fraser index of economic freedom,
and the mortality rate of children under age five serve as instruments. These
variables—the first two proxies for governance, the third a proxy for need—
have been shown to be related to aid allocations (McKinlay and Little 1977;
Hout 2004; Thiele, Nunnenkamp, and Dreher 2007). They are indeed highly
correlated with aid for education in the sample and not significantly correlated
with school enrollment once the other relevant regressors are controlled
for.16 Government expenditure on education is taken as an exogenous regressor
in column 3; both government expenditure and aid are instrumented in
column 4. The International Country Risk Guide index for ethnic tensions is
used as an instrument for government expenditure on education. While the pre-
vious literature does not come up with reliable instruments for government
spending (Feldmann forthcoming), ethnic tensions have been shown to affect
expenditure.17
The overidentifying restrictions are not rejected at conventional levels of
significance, suggesting that the model is well specified, and there is no sign
that the instruments are endogenous. The instruments are jointly significant at
the 1 percent level in the first-stage regressions, indicating some power.
However, the F-test statistic falls short of the rule of thumb threshold of 10
proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997). Nelson and Startz (1990) show that the
distribution of the 2SLS estimator and the t-statistics are only poorly approxi-
mated by the asymptotic representation with weak instruments. This is likely
to imply test statistics with nonnormal distributions, making 2SLS misleading
(Staiger and Stock 1997). According to Cruz and Moreira (2005), weak instru-
ments exacerbate the finite sample bias inherent in the 2SLS estimator. Given
that the specifications include the lagged dependent variable, 2SLS estimations
may also suffer from dynamic panel bias. These estimations, therefore, have to
be interpreted with caution. As all relevant test statistics do not reject the
GMM specification, the preferred results are those based on the GMM
regression (column 2 of table 1).
The effect of aid for education on primary school enrollment remains posi-
tive and significant at least at the 5 percent level when the two instrumental
variable techniques are used. The lagged dependent variable is significant at
the 1 percent level; per capita GDP and urbanization are insignificant. As
before, so is government expenditure on education. The results on adult lit-
eracy are mixed. The share of the population under 15 has a completely
16. Initially, a measure of democracy was also included in the list of instruments. However, given
that democracy might be important for the effect of aid on enrollment (as argued below), only the
former three variables are used. The results are not affected by this choice.
17. Von Hagen (2005) argues that ideological and ethnic divisions result in higher government
spending because each segment of society tends to neglect the tax burden falling on other segments,
exacerbating the common pool problem.
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insignificant impact when estimated with GMM and a positive and significant
impact in the potentially misspecified 2SLS regressions. The 2SLS results may
appear counterintuitive, because having a larger share of the population under
15 would put pressure on the education system and would thus be expected to
reduce enrollment rates. However, the positive coefficient in the 2SLS esti-
mation is in line with the empirical evidence reported by Schultz (1988),
according to whom a larger share of school-age children affects various edu-
cational variables negatively but primary school enrollment positively.
The quantitative impact of aid on school enrollment is modest but not negli-
gible. With aid measured in per capita terms and the dependent variable in log-
arithms, the GMM specification implies that a $1 increase in aid (roughly
equivalent to the increase in average aid for education between 1975–79 and
1980–84 across the sample countries) increases school enrollment by about
0.29 percent. School enrollment would increase by 1.5 percent if donors kept
their promise to double aid efforts (from an average of $5 per capita to the
education sector in 2000–04). This increase is roughly equal to the increase in
average enrollment between 1995–99 and 2000–04.
The fixed-effects estimate implies a slightly smaller increase in school enroll-
ment, of about 0.26 percent for each additional dollar of aid. By contrast, the
quantitative impact indicated by the 2SLS regressions appears to be unrealisti-
cally high, with an additional dollar of per capita aid raising school enrollment
from 2.4 to 2.7 percent.18
For comparison, regressions were also run with aid and government expen-
diture measured as a percentage of GDP rather than in per capita terms. In the
fixed-effects specification, the qualitative results are very similar: aid increases
primary schooling at the 5 percent level of significance. In the preferred GMM
specification, however, aid does not significantly affect school enrollment when
measured as a percentage of GDP. This finding supports the reasoning that the
aid to GDP ratio is not as good a measure for assessing aid effectiveness with
respect to specific Millennium Development Goals as per capita aid. (The
results are shown in table S-1 in the supplemental appendix to this article,
available at http://wber.oxfordjournals.org/)
Given the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable, it is also possible to
calculate the long-run effect of aid on school enrollment. The estimates
reported in column 2 of table 1, the preferred GMM specification, and coeffi-
cients of 0.003 for aid and 0.65 for lagged aid suggest that the long-term effect
of an additional dollar of per capita aid is to raise school enrollment about 0.8
percent. The analysis was replicated excluding the population under the age of
15 as well as urbanization and per capita GDP (both of which were insigni-
ficant in the preferred specifications). The results do not change qualitatively
or quantitatively: aid still increases enrollment significantly under all
18. A second lag of the dependent variable was included to test whether this affected the results.
The coefficient turned out to be unaffected both quantitatively and qualitatively.
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specifications. Government expenditure on education remains completely
insignificant (see table S-2 in the online supplemental appendix).
I V. S E N S I T I V I T Y A N A L Y S I S
This section presents extensions of and tests for robustness of the previous
results, focusing on GMM specifications (table 2).19 It begins by considering
different aid measures. Ideally, one would employ aid disbursements for
primary or basic education. However, even commitment data on aid for
primary education are scarce, leaving an insufficient number of observations
for meaningful estimation. Disbursements of total aid for education are
available only since 1990. Moreover, inspection of the data suggests substantial
underreporting of disbursed aid for education by donors until recently.20 In
light of considerable measurement error, it is not surprising that the coefficient
of aid disbursements remains insignificant (column 1).
Total aid disbursements, for which data are available for the entire period of
observation, can be used instead of aid for education (column 2). But this aid
variable also turns out to be insignificant in both the fixed-effects and GMM
specifications. The finding that total aid has no impact on enrollment is not
surprising, as aid for education, albeit of rising relative importance, accounted
for just 8.2 percent of total aid in 2002–04 (Thiele, Nunnenkamp, and Dreher
2007).
School enrollment still rises with aid (at the 5 percent level of significance)
when aid commitments per child below the age of 15 are used rather than com-
mitments per capita (column 3). Primary completion rates have been suggested
as superior to enrollment rates in measuring progress toward education-related
Millennium Development Goals. However, data on primary completion are
available only since 1988, reducing the sample size considerably. The small
sample size may explain why aid for education does not significantly affect
completion rates at conventional levels of significance (column 4).
In various other respects, the results prove fairly robust. In additional tests
for robustness government expenditure on education is dropped from the
equation, levels of school enrollment are used instead of logs, and the sample
period is restricted to years before 1998. The concern that results may be
biased because the dependent variable is bounded is addressed above, and two
sets of outlying countries are omitted. The robustness of the results to the
inclusion of additional variables suggested in the literature and to the exclusion
of the lagged dependent variable is also tested. In most of these tests, the key
result remains unaffected.
19. Corresponding fixed-effects estimates are shown in supplemental appendix table S-3.
20. Only in 2001–04 did disbursed aid exceed 50 percent of committed aid for education. Reported
disbursements represented less than 10 percent of commitments in the early 1990s.
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TA B L E 2. School Enrollment and Aid: Tests for Robustness, System General Method of Moments, 1970–2004
Variable
(1)
School
enrollment
(2)
School
enrollment
(3)
School
enrollment
(4)
Completion
rates
(5)
School
enrollment
(6)
School
enrollment
levels
(7)
School
enrollment
1970–97
(8)
School
enrollmenta
(9)
School
enrollmentb
(10)
School
enrollmentc
(11)
School
enrollment
(12)
School
enrollment
(13)
School
enrollment
(14)
School
enrollment
(15)
School
enrollment
Lagged dependent 0.845
(7.36)***
0.530
(5.40)***
0.65
(8.46)***
0.821
(8.30)***
0.603
(5.20)***
0.516
(4.46)***
0.617
(6.42)***
0.574
(7.48)***
0.588
(5.98)***
0.617
(6.42)***
0.631
(5.26)***
0.626
(6.33)***
0.602
(7.05)***
0.594
(5.47)***
0.597
(6.50)***
Expenditure on
education (per
capita)
20.00006
(0.60)
0.00007
(0.69)
20.00009
(1.21)
0.00023
(1.41)
20.00102
(0.16)
20.00008
(0.94)
20.00534
(0.73)
20.00004
(0.57)
20.00008
(0.94)
20.00001
(0.10)
20.00002
(0.24)
20.00005
(0.74)
20.00010
(1.16)
20.00009
(1.07)
Aid for education,
disbursements
(per capita)
0.0033
(0.89)
Total aid
disbursements
(per capita)
0.00004
(0.32)
Aid for education
commitments
(per child)
0.0008
(2.47)**
Aid for education
commitments
(per capita)
20.002
(0.46)
0.002
(2.10)**
0.182
(1.79)*
0.003
(2.11)**
0.004
(1.75)*
0.002
(1.79)*
0.003
(2.11)**
0.002
(3.37)***
0.003
(2.54)**
0.001
(0.29)
0.003
(2.51)**
0.009
(0.97)
Literacy rate 0.001
(0.52)
0.003
(2.55)**
0.002
(2.28)**
0.001
(0.78)
0.002
(1.72)*
0.224
(2.77)***
0.002
(2.23)**
0.002
(2.30)**
0.003
(2.27)**
0.002
(2.23)**
0.002
(2.65)***
0.003
(2.30)**
0.003
(2.19)**
0.003
(2.23)**
0.003
(2.43)**
Pupil-teacher ratio 4.13E2 04
(0.23)
Unit costs of
enrollment
20.002
(1.63)
Aid-squared 0.00003
(0.61)
International crisis 0.16
(1.91)*
Democracy 0.004
(0.60)
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Democracy*aid 20.001
(0.78)
Number of countries 94 96 96 92 99 96 96 90 87 96 89 95 96 96 96
Number of
observations
199 269 269 194 306 269 269 221 238 269 176 268 269 269 269
Maximum number of
periods
3 6 6 3 6 6 6 6 6 6 3 6 6 6 6
Number of
instruments
21 42 42 24 36 42 42 42 42 42 34 43 62 62 44
Hansen test
(Prob. chi2)
0.14 0.58 0.35 0.43 0.25 0.32 0.42 0.31 0.45 0.42 0.34 0.43 0.39 0.43 0.30
Differences-in-Sargan
test (Prob. chi2)
0.06 0.92 0.13 0.94 0.28 0.19 0.41 0.21 0.40 0.21 0.24 0.18 0.73 0.16 0.25
Arellano-Bond test
(Prob. z)
. 0.12 0.18 . 0.06 0.61 0.19 0.29 0.82 0.19 . 0.20 0.19 0.28 0.18
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, estimated robustly. The dependent variable is in logarithms.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
aExcludes countries in the highest enrollment quartile.
bExcludes Botswana, Indonesia, Malawi, Rwanda, Togo, and Uganda (poor countries for which enrollment rates have risen particularly rapidly,
according to Clemens 2004).
cExcludes Angola, Kuwait, Liberia, Lesotho, Malawi, and Tanzania (reported enrollment rates increased by more than 20 percent in a single year and
by 10 percentage points at least once over the period under consideration).
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in table A-1.
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The reason to exclude government expenditure on education is that the aid
coefficient may be biased downward when government expenditure is included
and (part of) aid runs through the budget. The aid coefficient is supposed to
capture the expenditure-augmenting effect of aid in addition to effects on
enrollment that are attributable to a higher productivity of aid relative to gov-
ernment expenditure. The fact that the coefficient of aid is hardly affected
when comparing column 5 in table 2 with column 2 in table 1 suggests that
the expenditure-increasing effect of aid is not relevant, either because aid is not
accounted for in the budget or because it is highly fungible.
Using enrollment levels instead of logs (column 6) leaves aid significant at
the 10 percent level. One additional dollar of per capita aid increases school
enrollment by about 0.2 percentage points. The years after 1997 are excluded
because the results may be distorted by the revision of educational data since
1998 and by the recent shift from sector-specific aid, including aid for edu-
cation, toward general budget support and multisector aid. Yet the key result is
not affected: aid increases enrollment at the 5 percent level of significance
(column 7).
The results reported in column 8 are based on a restricted sample that
excludes all countries in the highest quartile in enrollment rates. In this way, a
check can be run to determine whether the upper bound of the dependent vari-
able implies a downward bias for aid effectiveness when including recipient
countries with enrollment rates already close to 100 percent. The aid coeffi-
cient turns out to be somewhat larger for the restricted sample compared with
column 2 in table 1. The same pattern applies to the fixed-effects estimates
(column 8 in supplemental appendix table S-3 and column 1 in table 1).
Standard errors are larger for the restricted sample, which is not surprising
given the smaller variance of enrollment rates and the smaller number of
observations.
Next some potentially influential outliers are excluded, though to little
effect. Botswana, Indonesia, Malawi, Rwanda, Togo, and Uganda are treated
as outliers (column 9). Clemens (2004) identifies these countries as examples of
poor countries for which enrollment rates reported by UNESCO have risen
particularly rapidly, at least in some cases at the cost of deteriorating education
quality (as reflected in high failure and repetition rates in Rwanda and Togo,
steeply rising pupil–teacher ratios in Malawi, and lower test scores in Uganda).
Alternatively, Angola, Kuwait, Liberia, Lesotho, Malawi, and Tanzania are
excluded (column 10), because reported enrollment rates increased by more
than 20 percent in a single year and by 10 percentage points at least once over
the period under consideration.21
21. Both relative and absolute changes are considered when defining the cut-off point, because the
two deviate widely at the tails of the distribution. A moderate absolute rise in enrollment from 20 to
25, for example, implies a relative increase of 25 percent.
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Alternative specifications include the pupil–teacher ratio, the unit cost of
education (government expenditure on education divided by the population
under 15, as a percent of per capita GDP), and a dummy variable for a crisis
of international scale in the recipient country as additional control variables
(columns 11, 12, and 14). The pupil–teacher ratio and the unit cost of pro-
duction are applied as additional supply factors in the social production func-
tion framework.22 The dummy variable for international crisis is included
because enrollment might be expected to decline in such years and crises might
be correlated with aid.
With the exception of the crisis dummy variable, none of the additional vari-
ables is significant at conventional levels. In all cases, the impact of aid remains
significant at the 5 percent level. Aid-squared has often been used in the litera-
ture on aid and growth (see, for example, Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp 2004),
because aid may suffer from decreasing returns once its optimal degree is
exceeded. Thus aid-squared is included in column 15. Although aid and
aid-squared are not individually significant, they are jointly significant at the 5
percent level.
Finally, the possibility that the impact of aid on school enrollment might
depend on democratic governance in the recipient countries is taken into
account. This issue relates to the ongoing discussion of whether donors should
target aid to better-governed countries. According to Svensson (1999), demo-
cratic institutions provide an institutionalized check on governments, encoura-
ging them to use aid more productively. The impact of aid on education
outcomes is thus hypothesized to be greater the greater the degree of democ-
racy. The test of whether aid is more effective under conditions of good govern-
ance treats governance as exogenous to aid, which is in line with much of the
previous literature.23 The interaction between aid and democracy is supposed
to reveal a differential impact of aid. As a proxy for democratic governance, an
index is constructed with data provided by Freedom House (2004). Data on
this variable are available for a large number of countries and over most of the
years under study.
While foreign aid does not increase enrollment individually in a significant
way, aid and its interaction with democracy are jointly significant at the 10
percent level (column 15). The level of democracy and its interaction with
aid are neither individually nor jointly significant at conventional levels.
22. Ideally, one would also want to control for the “price” of schooling. The lack of data does not
permit this to be done.
23. The seminal contribution of Burnside and Dollar (2000) triggered the debate on whether aid is
more effective under good policy conditions, treating the policy variables (openness, inflation, budget
surplus) as exogenous. In a subsequent article, Burnside and Dollar (2004, p. 4) note that “researchers
coming from the left, the right, and the center have all concluded that aid as traditionally practiced has
not had systematic, beneficial effects on institutions and policies.” Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavnani
(2004) use instruments for institutional and policy variables; their use does not affect their results
significantly.
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It therefore appears that, in contrast to the hypothesis derived by Svensson
(1999), the impact of aid does not depend on democracy. Aid for education
may help achieve universal education even in countries characterized by
less-advanced democratic institutions. Whether this result is robust to the speci-
fication of the model and the measurement of democracy is an interesting ques-
tion for future research.24
V. C O N C L U S I O N S
The effectiveness of sector-specific aid on education is assessed empirically
within the framework of social production functions for almost 100 developing
economies over the period 1970–2004, with the education Millennium
Development Goals, particularly primary school enrollment, considered as
outcome variables. The results suggest that higher per capita aid significantly
increases primary school enrollment and domestic government spending on
education does not. This result is robust to the method of estimation, the
inclusion of instruments to control for the endogeneity of aid, and the set of
control variables included in the estimations.
These findings are in sharp contrast to Easterly’s (2006) verdict that foreign
aid has done “so little good.” At the same time, the analysis underscores the
need to disaggregate aid in order to assess its effectiveness. Aid specifically
devoted to the education sector modestly but not negligibly contributes to
achieving universal primary education in developing economies. The preferred
(GMM) specification (column 2 in table 1) implies that an additional dollar of
per capita aid to the education sector increases school enrollment by about 0.3
percent. Consequently, school enrollment could improve considerably if donors
kept their promise to double current aid efforts.
Aid that is effective in improving education should also have favorable long-
term effects on economic growth, which might not be measurable with conven-
tional econometric methods.25 But even if the link between education and
growth turned out to be weak, the improved education outcome would be
important in its own right, because “schooling has a large number of direct
beneficial effects beyond raising economic output, such as lower child mor-
tality” (Pritchett 2001, p. 388).
The positive effects of aid on education outcomes in recipient countries not-
withstanding, the analysis points to some caveats that donors should keep in
mind when giving aid. In contrast to some other studies (Gomanee and others
2003; Mosley, Hudson, and Verschoor 2004), this study finds no evidence that
aid works by increasing government spending on education. Estimates are
24. In column 16 of supplemental appendix table S-3, results are also reported after omitting the
lagged dependent variable from the fixed-effects specification. The main result is unchanged. Under this
specification, the literacy rate positively affects enrollment, with a highly significant coefficient.
25. The longer-term growth effects of aid are difficult if not impossible to capture, as Clemens,
Radelet, and Bhavnani (2004) argue. For a different view, see Rajan and Subramanian (2005).
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hardly affected when accounting for both the productivity-enhancing and the
expenditure-augmenting effects of aid (by excluding government spending from
the estimations). It remains open to debate whether this is mainly because
donors deliberately decided to grant aid outside the budget or because aid was
highly fungible in the past. This question may be resolved in future research if
donors increasingly shift from project-related aid to general budget support.
For the time being, the complete insignificance of government spending on edu-
cation in the estimations cautions against expecting too much from the “new
form of conditionality” proposed by Mosley, Hudson, and Verschoor (2004).
It remains to be seen whether the ability to use aid for education as a means of
strengthening the poverty orientation of government spending on education has
improved with the advent of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.
Lacking conclusive evidence that conditionality works donors should be
selective when determining the allocation of aid for education. The most
obvious criterion for selectivity is the need for aid in education, as reflected in
particularly low enrollment and completion rates. The targeting of aid for edu-
cation according to need leaves much to be desired, as Thiele, Nunnenkamp,
and Dreher (2007) show.
Another selectivity criterion stressed by many donors—the quality of govern-
ance in recipient countries—might be less important than widely believed.
Investigation of this issue is left to future research.
Finally, it would be desirable to assess whether the effectiveness of aid for
education could be enhanced by shifting donor resources within the sector
toward basic education. Basic education accounted for about one-third of total
aid for education by donors in 2002–04 (Thiele, Nunnenkamp, and Dreher
2007). This low level of spending is not only in conflict with Millennium
Development Goal2, which would require greater concentration on basic edu-
cation, but also with findings that social returns to primary education tend to be
particularly high in low-income countries (World Bank 1995). Future research
may be able to address this issue by disaggregating aid and education data more
finely once longer time-series are available for a larger number of countries.
A P P E N D I X
TA B L E A-1. Definitions and Sources
Variable Description Source
School enrollment Ratio of number of children of official
school age enrolled in school to number
of children of official school age (net
enrollment ratio)
World Bank (2005)
(Continued)
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TABLE A-1. Continued
Variable Description Source
Primary completion rate Number of students successfully
completing the last year of (or
graduating from) primary school in a
given year divided by the number of
children of official graduation age in
the population
World Bank (2005)
Expenditure on education Public spending on public education plus
subsidies to private education at the
primary, secondary, and tertiary levels.
Variable measured both per capita and
as percent of GDP
World Bank (2003,
2005)
Aid for education
(commitments)
Aid commitments by all donors according
to CRS Purpose Code 110. Includes aid
for basic education, secondary
education, postsecondary education,
and unspecified levels of education.
CRS guidelines require sector-specific
program assistance and budget support
in the form of sector-wide approaches
to be subsumed under education when
meant to benefit this sector. Variable
measured both per capita, per child
below age 15, and as percent of
recipient country’s GDP
OECD (2006)
Aid for education
(disbursements)
Aid disbursements by all donors
according to CRS Purpose Code 110,
Form 2. Coverage is same as for
commitments. Variable measured per
capita
OECD (2006)
Total disbursements Total aid (in all sectors) disbursed by all
donors. Variable measured per capita
OECD (2006)
Literacy rate Percentage of people 15 and older who
can, with understanding, read and write
a short simple statement on their
everyday life
World Bank (2005)
GDP per capita Per capita GDP in purchasing power
parity terms (2000 international
dollars)
World Bank (2005)
Population under 15 Percentage of total population under 15 World Bank (2005)
Urbanization Share of total population living in areas
defined as urban in each country
World Bank (2005)
Democracy index [82 (political rights index þ civil liberties
index)] /2
Freedom House (2004)
Pupil–teacher ratio Number of pupils enrolled in primary
school divided by number of primary
school teachers (regardless of their
teaching assignment)
World Bank (2005)
(Continued)
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TABLE A-1. Continued
Variable Description Source
Unit costs of enrollment Government expenditure on education
divided by population under 15, as
percent of per capita GDP
World Bank (2005)
International crisis Dummy variable that takes value of 1
when a country is involved in an
international crisis
Wilkenfeld and Brecher
(2006)
Government stability Assesses government’s ability to carry out
its declared programs and its ability to
remain in office. Risk rating assigned is
sum of three subcomponents
(government unity, legislative strength,
popular support), each with a
maximum score of four points and a
minimum score of 0 points. A score of
4 points indicates very low risk and a
score of 0 points very high risk
ICRG (2005)
Under-five mortality Probability that newborn baby will die
before reaching age five if subject to
current age-specific mortality rates.
Variable expressed as rate per 1,000
World Bank (2005)
Economic Freedom Composite 0–10 index of economic
freedom; higher values reflect greater
freedom
Gwartney and Lawson
(2004)
Source: Authors’ description based on cited data sources.
TA B L E A-2. Summary Statistics (Estimation Sample, Table 1, Column 2)
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum
Standard
deviation
School enrollment (logarithm) 4.36 3.10 4.68 0.31
Primary completion rate (logarithm) 4.26 2.77 4.72 0.46
Expenditure on education (per capita) 95.78 3.56 697.50 111.94
Expenditure on education (percent of GDP) 4.28 0.83 11.58 1.88
Aid for education, commitments (per capita) 3.67 0.00 64.33 6.51
Aid for education, commitments (percent of
GDP)
0.43 0.00 3.23 0.57
Aid for education, commitments per child 10.56 0.00 292.84 22.38
Aid for education, disbursements per capita 0.86 0.00 21.90 1.90
Total aid disbursements per capita 33.50 22.34 304.07 37.50
Literacy rate 73.79 10.30 99.80 22.75
GDP per capita 4783 494 16050 3497
Population under 15 36.89 15.02 51.09 8.62
Urbanization 48.16 5.14 92.63 21.55
Democracy, index 4.04 1.00 7.00 1.76
Pupil-teacher ratio 31.53 10.28 77.03 13.20
International crisis 0.07 0.00 0.80 0.16
Unit costs of enrollment 13 1.76 38 7
Government stability 7.84 2.28 11.08 1.78
(Continued)
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TABLE A-2. Continued
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum
Standard
deviation
Under-five mortality 75.14 7.50 320.00 65.48
Economic freedom 5.76 2.90 7.50 0.98
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in table A-1.
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